Observability Increases the Demand for Commitment Devices
| Autor: | Jeffrey Naecker, Christine L. Exley |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2014 |
| Předmět: |
Computer science
Strategy and Management 05 social sciences SIGNAL (programming language) Management Science and Operations Research Behavioral economics Microeconomics Action (philosophy) restrict 0502 economics and business Dynamic inconsistency Observability 050207 economics Set (psychology) Mechanism (sociology) 050205 econometrics |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2498145 |
| Popis: | Previous research often interprets the choice to restrict one’s future opportunity set as evidence for sophisticated time inconsistency. We propose an additional mechanism that may contribute to the demand for commitment technology: the desire to signal to others. We present a field experiment where participants can choose to give up money if they do not follow through with an action. When commitment choices are made public rather than kept private, we find significantly higher uptake rates. Data are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2501 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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