Performance Measurement, Expectancy and Agency Theory: An Experimental Study
| Autor: | Mirjam van Praag, Randolph Sloof |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Human Capital (ASE, FEB), ABS Other Research (FEB) |
| Rok vydání: | 2007 |
| Předmět: |
Erhebungstechniken und Analysetechniken der Sozialwissenschaften
Expectancy theory Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Economics and Econometrics jel:D81 Sozialwissenschaften Soziologie jel:C91 Principal–agent problem Contrast (statistics) Performance measurement Real effort experiments Agency theory Personnel economics Term (time) Methods and Techniques of Data Collection and Data Analysis Statistical Methods Computer Methods Noise jel:J33 Agency (sociology) Statistics agency theory performance measurement experiments Economics ddc:300 Social sciences sociology anthropology |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(3-4), 794-809. Elsevier |
| ISSN: | 0167-2681 |
| Popis: | Theoretical analyses of (optimal) performance measures are typically performed within the realm of the linear agency model. This model implies that, for a given compensation scheme, the agent’s optimal effort is unrelated to the amount of noise in the performance measure. In contrast, expectancy theory as developed by psychologists predicts lower effort levels for noisier performance measures. We conduct a real effort laboratory experiment and find that effort levels are invariant to changes in the distribution of the noise term. This suggests that enriching the economic model commonly applied within this area by including an expectancy parameter is not needed.This discussion paper has resulted in an article in the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67(3-4), 794-809. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full Text from ScienceDirect