Hospital competition with soft budgets
| Autor: | Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, Odd Rune Straume |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Universidade do Minho |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Social Sciences
hospital competition soft budgets quality cost efficiency soft budgets Cost efficiency 0502 economics and business Hospital competition ddc:330 Hotelling Modell Quality Soft budgets 050207 economics L13 050208 finance Krankenhaus I18 I11 Budgetbeschränkung 05 social sciences L32 Dienstleistungsqualität 1. No poverty Ciências Sociais::Economia e Gestão jel:I11 hospital competition Social science: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212 [VDP] Wirtschaftlichkeit jel:L32 jel:I18 quality jel:L13 Economia e Gestão [Ciências Sociais] |
| Zdroj: | Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal Repositório Científico de Acesso Aberto de Portugal (RCAAP) instacron:RCAAP |
| Popis: | We study the incentives for hospitals to provide quality and expend cost-reducing effort when their budgets are soft, i.e., the payer may cover deficits or confiscate surpluses. The basic set up is a Hotelling model with two hospitals that differ in location and face demand uncertainty, where the hospitals run deficits (surpluses) in the high (low) demand state. Softer budgets reduce cost efficiency, while the effect on quality is ambiguous. For given cost efficiency, softer budgets increase quality since parts of the expenditures may be covered by the payer. However, softer budgets reduce cost-reducing effort and the profit margin, which in turn weakens quality incentives. We also find that profit confiscation reduces quality and cost-reducing effort. First best is achieved by a strict no-bailout and no-profit-confiscation policy when the regulated price is optimally set. However, for suboptimal prices a more lenient bailout policy can be welfare improving. Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT) COMPETE QREN FEDER |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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