Ecological variation and institutionalized inequality in hunter-gatherer societies
| Autor: | Brian F. Codding, Eric Alden Smith |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Resource (biology)
Inequality media_common.quotation_subject Social Sciences Distribution (economics) Hierarchy Social 03 medical and health sciences Politics Spatio-Temporal Analysis Social Evolution Economic inequality Cultural Evolution Natural Resources Humans 0601 history and archaeology Anthropology Cultural History Ancient American Indian or Alaska Native 030304 developmental biology media_common 0303 health sciences Hierarchy 060101 anthropology Multidisciplinary Enslavement Geography Ecology business.industry Group conflict 06 humanities and the arts Models Theoretical Food Insecurity Socioeconomic Factors North America business Chiefdom |
| Zdroj: | Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A |
| ISSN: | 1091-6490 0027-8424 |
| Popis: | Research examining institutionalized hierarchy tends to focus on chiefdoms and states, while its emergence among small-scale societies remains poorly understood. Here, we test multiple hypotheses for institutionalized hierarchy, using environmental and social data on 89 hunter-gatherer societies along the Pacific coast of North America. We utilize statistical models capable of identifying the main correlates of sustained political and economic inequality, while controlling for historical and spatial dependence. Our results indicate that the most important predictors relate to spatiotemporal distribution of resources. Specifically, higher reliance on and ownership of clumped aquatic (primarily salmon) versus wild plant resources is associated with greater political-economic inequality, measuring the latter as a composite of internal social ranking, unequal access to food resources, and presence of slavery. Variables indexing population pressure, scalar stress, and intergroup conflict exhibit little or no correlation with variation in inequality. These results are consistent with models positing that hierarchy will emerge when individuals or coalitions (e.g., kin groups) control access to economically defensible, highly clumped resource patches, and use this control to extract benefits from subordinates, such as productive labor and political allegiance in a patron–client system. This evolutionary ecological explanation might illuminate how and why institutionalized hierarchy emerges among many small-scale societies. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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