Threat of sabotage as a driver of collective action

Autor:	De Jaegher, Kris, Theoretische micro-economie, UU LEG Research UUSE Multidisciplinary Economics
Přispěvatelé:	Theoretische micro-economie, UU LEG Research UUSE Multidisciplinary Economics
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2022
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics GeneralLiterature_REFERENCE(e.g. dictionaries encyclopedias glossaries) Star Journals
Zdroj:	Economic Journal, 132(647). Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:	0013-0133
DOI:	10.1093/ej/ueac023
Popis:	A model is presented where the welfare of contributors to a public good can increase when they face an adversary who ex post sabotages their efforts. It is a best response for the adversary to maximally sabotage the smallest effort, thus increasing a defector's marginal product of effort. This creates a kink in the individual contributor's payoff function around the equilibrium effort, which can lock contributors into exerting high effort. For a sufficiently large degree of complementarity between the contributors’ efforts, the adversary increases contributors’ welfare. This result is robust when departing from several simplifying assumptions of the model.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
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