Econometrics of Scoring Auctions
| Autor: | Isabelle Perrigne, Quang Vuong, Michel Simioni, Jean-Jacques Laffont |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées, University of Southern California (USC), Rice University [Houston], Marchés, Organisations, Institutions et Stratégies d'Acteurs (UMR MOISA), Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (Cirad)-Centre International de Hautes Etudes Agronomiques Méditerranéennes - Institut Agronomique Méditerranéen de Montpellier (CIHEAM-IAMM), Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), New York University [New York] (NYU), NYU System (NYU), Li, T., Pesaran, M., Terrel, D., Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Centre International de Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM)-Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier (Montpellier SupAgro), Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement (Institut Agro)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
[SHS.STAT]Humanities and Social Sciences/Methods and statistics
cost efficiency Cost efficiency Computer science Scoring rule media_common.quotation_subject 05 social sciences Optimal mechanism nonparametric estimation [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance scoring auctions Identification (information) Procurement quality Kernel (statistics) 0502 economics and business Econometrics identification Common value auction Quality (business) procurement 050207 economics 050205 econometrics media_common |
| Zdroj: | Essays in honor of Cheng Hsiao Li, T.; Pesaran, M.; Terrel, D. Essays in honor of Cheng Hsiao, 41, Emerald Publishing Limited, 2020, Advances in Econometrics, 978-1-78973-958-9. ⟨10.1108/S0731-905320200000041010⟩ |
| DOI: | 10.1108/s0731-905320200000041010 |
| Popis: | This chapter develops a structural framework for the analysis of scoring procurement auctions where bidder’s quality and bid are taken into account. With exogenous quality, the authors characterize the optimal mechanism whether the buyer is private or public and show that the optimal scoring rule need not be linear in the bid. The model primitives include the buyer benefit function, the bidders’ cost inefficiencies distribution and cost function, and potentially the cost of public funds. We show that the model primitives are nonparametrically identified under mild functional assumptions from the buyer’s choice, firms’ bids and qualities. The authors then develop a multistep kernel-based procedure to estimate the model primitives and provide their convergence rates. Our identification and estimation results are general as they apply to other scoring rules including quasi-linear ones. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|