Elisabeth on Free Will, Preordination, and Philosophical Doubt
Autor: | Martina Reuter |
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Přispěvatelé: | Ebbersmeyer, Sabrina, Hutton, Sarah |
Rok vydání: | 2021 |
Předmět: |
kritiikki
libertarian media_common.quotation_subject Passions Metaphysics tahdonvapaus vapaa tahto mind and body determinismi filosofia God Free will mind-body interaction Relation (history of concept) Order (virtue) Philosophical methodology media_common Philosophy determinism providence Determinism Epistemology Descartes René mielenfilosofia Criticism free will Jumala |
Zdroj: | Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ISBN: 9783030715267 |
DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-030-71527-4_9 |
Popis: | Elisabeth is widely known as a critic of René Descartes' account of mind--body interaction and scholarly interpretations of her view on the will most often pose the question about the freedom of the will in relation to bodily impulses such as the passions. This chapter takes a different perspective and focuses on the problem of the compatibility of free will and providence, as it is discussed in a sequence of six letters that Elisabeth and Descartes wrote between September 1645 and January 1646. The chapter focuses on this specific metaphysical problem in order to ask what Elisabeth's remarks on the topic can tell about her general philosophical method as well as about her particular philosophical worries. The chapter divides into three parts. The first part discusses Elisabeth's initial philosophical interest in the question of free will and providence, and recounts the arguments presented by her and Descartes. The second part discusses the philosophical foundation for Descartes' position and Elisabeth's criticism of this position. The final part compares Elisabeth's criticism of Descartes' account of the compatibility of free will and providence with her criticism of his account of mind--body interaction, which she develops in her three first letters to him, written in 1643. It is argued that at the core of both criticisms we find Elisabeth's search for answers based on reason and a dissatisfaction with Descartes' reliance on the incomprehensible nature of God as a basis for some of his philosophical arguments. peerReviewed |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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