Farsighted manipulation and exploitation in networks
| Autor: | Péter Bayer, Ronald Peeters, P. Jean-Jacques Herings |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Microeconomics & Public Economics, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Maastricht University [Maastricht], University of Otago [Dunedin, Nouvelle-Zélande] |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
h41 - Public Goods Exploit Comparative statics Computer science media_common.quotation_subject Population Stochastic and Dynamic Games Evolutionary Games Repeated Games Outcome (game theory) GAMES PUBLIC-GOODS Microeconomics education Public Goods Sophistication Network Formation and Analysis: Theory media_common Simple (philosophy) JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games education.field_of_study JEL: H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H41 - Public Goods Economic agents ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Public good [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information Knowledge and Uncertainty/D.D8.D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory d85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory Myopic and farsighted players EXPERIENCE Networks |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Theory, 196:105311. Elsevier Science Journal of Economic Theory Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2021, 196, ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2021.105311⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105311 |
| Popis: | National audience; Farsighted economic agents can use their advantage to exploit their more myopic counterparts. In public goods games played on networks, such an agent will attempt to manipulate as many of his neighbors as possible to contribute to the public good. We study the exploitation of a myopic population by a single farsighted player in such games. We show the existence and payoff-uniqueness of optimal farsighted strategies in every network structure. For all optimal strategies, the set of absorbing effort profiles is non-empty and is generally neither a subset or a superset of the set of Nash equilibria of the static game. Optimal long-run effort profiles for the farsighted player can be reached via a simple dependence-withdrawal strategy and the farsighted player's effects on the myopic players are only felt locally. We characterize the lower and upper bounds of long-run payoffs the farsighted player can attain in a given network and examine comparative statics with respect to adding a new link. The farsighted player always benefits from linking to more opponents and is always harmed by his neighbors linking to each other. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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