Patterns, noise, and Beliefs
Autor: | Lajos L. Brons |
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Jazyk: | angličtina |
Rok vydání: | 2019 |
Předmět: |
Philosophy of mind
Principle of charity Analogy 050109 social psychology 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine History and Philosophy of Science mental content Argument Frege's Puzzle 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Empirical evidence lcsh:B1-5802 lcsh:Philosophy (General) 05 social sciences descriptivism Irrationality propositional attitude reports Epistemology Philosophy principle of charity frege’s puzzle lcsh:B beliefs Linguistic description Psychology lcsh:Philosophy. Psychology. Religion 030217 neurology & neurosurgery |
Zdroj: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology, Vol 23, Iss 1, Pp 19-51 (2019) Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 No. 1 (2019); 19-51 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; Vol. 23 Núm. 1 (2019); 19-51 Principia: an international journal of epistemology; v. 23 n. 1 (2019); 19-51 Principia (Florianópolis. Online) Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC) instacron:UFSC |
ISSN: | 1808-1711 1414-4247 |
Popis: | In "Real Patterns" Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett's analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or "noisiness" of what someone believes, and the same belief can be described by different sentences or propositions (which is illustrated by Dennett's analogy, some Gettier cases, and Frege's puzzle), but in some contexts some of these competing descriptions are misleading or even false. Faithful (or truthful) description must be guided by a principle (or principles) related to the principle of charity: belief descriptions should not attribute irrationality to the believer or have other kinds of "deviant" implications. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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