Strict Propriety is Weak
| Autor: | Benjamin A. Levinstein, Catrin Campbell-Moore |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: | |
| Zdroj: | Campbell-Moore, C & Levinstein, B A 2021, ' Strict Propriety is Weak ', Analysis, vol. 81, no. 1, anaa001, pp. 8-13 . https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa001 |
| DOI: | 10.1093/analys/anaa001 |
| Popis: | Considerations of accuracy – the epistemic good of having credences close to truth-values – have led to the justification of a host of epistemic norms. These arguments rely on specific ways of measuring accuracy. In particular, the accuracy measure should be strictly proper. However, the main argument for strict propriety supports only weak propriety. But strict propriety follows from weak propriety given strict truth directedness (which is non-negotiable) and additivity (which is both very common and plausible). So no further argument is necessary. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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