Competition Within A Cartel: League Conduct And Team Conduct In The Market For Baseball Player Services

Autor:	Donald G. Ferguson, Kenneth G. Stewart, J. C. H. Jones
Rok vydání:	2000
Předmět:	Competition (economics) Economics and Econometrics Willingness to pay restrict Cartel Economics Advertising Sample (statistics) Marketing League Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Anecdotal evidence
Zdroj:	The Review of Economics and Statistics. 82(3):422-430
Popis:	A model of major league baseball is developed which distinguishes between league behavior and individual team behavior.The league is viewed as setting rules that restrict the team's willingness to pay and/or impose costs on the transfer of players between teams. Given these rules, teams then compete for player services. The model is estimated and tested. The evidence suggests that the restrictive effect of league rules on player salaries declined between 1986-1988 and 1989-1991, consistent with anecdotal evidence. Within the rules established by the league, however, teams appear to behave as competitive price-takers through the entire sample period. © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2d3fcc157cec761519bdfbd5ccddc8c9 http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465300558911 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text ve formátu PDF Plný text ve formátu HTML
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