Necessary and sufficient conditions for pairwise majority decisions on path-connected domains
| Autor: | Souvik Roy, Madhuparna Karmokar, Ton Storcken |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | QE Math. Economics & Game Theory, RS: GSBE Theme Conflict & Cooperation, RS: FSE DACS Mathematics Centre Maastricht |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Majority rule
Unanimity Strategy-proofness Group (mathematics) General Social Sciences General Decision Sciences Pairwise majority rule Computer Science Applications Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Combinatorics Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) If and only if Choice function Domain (ring theory) Developmental and Educational Psychology Pairwise comparison Tree (set theory) Group strategy-proofness Single-peaked domains on trees Anonymity General Economics Econometrics and Finance Applied Psychology Mathematics |
| Zdroj: | Theory and Decision, 91(3), 313-336. Springer, Cham |
| ISSN: | 0040-5833 |
| Popis: | In this paper, we consider choice functions that are unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof and consider domains that are single-peaked on some tree. We prove the following three results in this setting. First, there exists a unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof choice function on a path-connected domain if and only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the number of agents is odd. Second, a choice function is unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof on a single-peaked domain on a tree if and only if it is the pairwise majority rule (also known as the tree-median rule) and the number of agents is odd. Third, there exists a unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and strategy-proof choice function on a strongly path-connected domain if and only if the domain is single-peaked on a tree and the number of agents is odd. As a corollary of these results, we obtain that there exists no unanimous, anonymous, symmetric, and group strategy-proof choice function on a path-connected domain if the number of agents is even. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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