Intuitive Probabilities and the Limitation of Moral Imagination
| Autor: | Samuel C. Rickless, Nicholas Christenfeld, Dana Kay Nelkin, Arseny A. Ryazanov, Jonathan Knutzen |
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| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
Adult
Male Thought experiment Cognitive Neuroscience media_common.quotation_subject Decision Making Experimental and Cognitive Psychology Moral reasoning Trolley problem Morals 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Judgment Artificial Intelligence Humans 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Moral dilemma Probability media_common 05 social sciences 06 humanities and the arts Morality 060302 philosophy Imagination Female Psychology Intuition Cognitive psychology |
| Zdroj: | Cognitive Science. 42:38-68 |
| ISSN: | 0364-0213 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/cogs.12598 |
| Popis: | There is a vast literature that seeks to uncover features underlying moral judgment by eliciting reactions to hypothetical scenarios such as trolley problems. These thought experiments assume that participants accept the outcomes stipulated in the scenarios. Across seven studies (N = 968), we demonstrate that intuition overrides stipulated outcomes even when participants are explicitly told that an action will result in a particular outcome. Participants instead substitute their own estimates of the probability of outcomes for stipulated outcomes, and these probability estimates in turn influence moral judgments. Our findings demonstrate that intuitive likelihoods are one critical factor in moral judgment, one that is not suspended even in moral dilemmas that explicitly stipulate outcomes. Features thought to underlie moral reasoning, such as intention, may operate, in part, by affecting the intuitive likelihood of outcomes, and, problematically, moral differences between scenarios may be confounded with non-moral intuitive probabilities. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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