Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?
| Autor: | Roy Lindelauf, Roel Leus, Herbert Hamers, Ben Hermans |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Research Group: Operations Research, Econometrics and Operations Research |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
game theory
Schedule Computer science 0211 other engineering and technologies Ocean Engineering 02 engineering and technology Management Science and Operations Research Nuclear weapon Computer security computer.software_genre 01 natural sciences Plot (graphics) secret projects 010104 statistics & probability symbols.namesake exposed time counter-terrorism 0101 mathematics Harm reduction 021103 operations research Cooperative game theory Harm Nash equilibrium Modeling and Simulation symbols Game theory computer |
| Zdroj: | Naval Research Logistics, 66(6), 451-468. John Wiley & Sons Inc. |
| ISSN: | 0894-069X |
| Popis: | A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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