Under the Radar: The Effects of Monitoring Firms on Tax Compliance
| Autor: | David López Rodríguez, Miguel Almunia |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
HD
Traceability Exploit media_common.quotation_subject Diversification (finance) ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING HJ Unit (housing) Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business Revenue 050207 economics Enforcement 050205 econometrics media_common Finance ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION biology business.industry 05 social sciences Euros biology.organism_classification Commerce business General Economics Econometrics and Finance Welfare |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 10:1-38 |
| ISSN: | 1945-774X 1945-7731 |
| DOI: | 10.1257/pol.20160229 |
| Popis: | This paper analyzes the effects of size-dependent tax enforcement on firms’ tax compliance. We exploit quasi-experimental variation generated by a Large Taxpayers Unit (LTU) in Spain, which monitors firms with more than €6 million in reported revenue. Firms strategically bunch below the eligibility threshold in order to avoid stricter tax enforcement. The response is stronger in sectors where transactions leave more paper trail, suggesting that monitoring effort and the traceability of information reported by firms are complements. We estimate that there would be substantial welfare gains from extending stricter tax monitoring to smaller businesses. (JEL H25, H26, H32, L25) |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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