Are emotional support animals prosthetics or pets? Body-like rights to emotional support animals
| Autor: | Sara Kolmes |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
050103 clinical psychology
030506 rehabilitation What treatment Health (social science) Emotional support GeneralLiterature_INTRODUCTORYANDSURVEY Internet privacy Prosthetic limb Subject (philosophy) Artificial Limbs 03 medical and health sciences Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous) Argument Therapy Animals Animals Humans 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Parallels Human Body business.industry Health Policy 05 social sciences Issues ethics and legal aspects InformationSystems_MISCELLANEOUS 0305 other medical science Psychology business |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Medical Ethics. 47:632-638 |
| ISSN: | 1473-4257 0306-6800 |
| DOI: | 10.1136/medethics-2020-106205 |
| Popis: | Many philosophers have argued that prosthetic limbs are the subjects of some of the same rights as traditional body parts. This is a strong argument in favour of respecting the rights of users of prosthetics. I argue that all of the reasons to consider paradigm prosthetics the subjects of body-like rights apply to the relationship between some emotional support animals (ESAs) and their handlers. ESAs are integrated into the functioning of their handlers in ways that parallel the ways that paradigm prosthetics are integrated into the functioning of their users. ESAs are also phenomenologically integrated into their handler’s lives in ways that parallel the phenomenological integration that prosthetic users experience. These parallels provide a strong reason to take the rights of ESA handlers much more seriously than we do now. I will highlight that the current treatment of ESA handlers presumes that they have no rights to ESAs at all. Even if ESAs are the subject of very minimal body-like rights, ESA handlers are having their rights violated. There are of course disanalogies between ESAs and paradigm prosthetics. Most notably, ESAs are alive and separate from their handlers. However, none of these disanalogies are relevant to the question of body-like rights. The differences between ESAs and paradigm prosthetics are in terms of what treatment is owed to them, not in terms of what rights their handlers and users should have. ESAs are not prosthetics, but they deserve some of the rights prosthetics do. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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