Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States
| Autor: | Hudson, P, Botzen, W.J.W., Czajkowski, J, Kreibich, H, UU LEG Research UUSE Multidisciplinary Economics, Overig wetenschappelijk personeel, UU LEG Research USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Environmental Economics, UU LEG Research UUSE Multidisciplinary Economics, Overig wetenschappelijk personeel, UU LEG Research USE Tjalling C. Koopmans Institute |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
010504 meteorology & atmospheric sciences Disaster risk reduction Moral hazard 0211 other engineering and technologies Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Environmental Science (miscellaneous) 01 natural sciences Morale hazard Natural hazard Taverne SDG 13 - Climate Action Casualty insurance Natural disaster health care economics and organizations 0105 earth and related environmental sciences 021110 strategic defence & security studies Actuarial science Risk aversion SDG 11 - Sustainable Cities and Communities humanities Business |
| Zdroj: | Land Economics, 93(2), 179. University of Wisconsin Press Land Economics, 93(2), 179-208. University of Wisconsin Press Hudson, P G M B, Botzen, W J W, Czajkowski, J & Kreibich, H 2017, ' Moral Hazard in Natural Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States ', Land Economics, vol. 93, no. 2, pp. 179-208 . https://doi.org/10.3368/le.93.2.179 Land Economics |
| ISSN: | 1543-8325 0023-7639 |
| DOI: | 10.3368/le.93.2.179 |
| Popis: | Moral hazard in natural disaster insurance markets results in policyholders preparing less, increasing the risk they face. However, moral hazard may not arise, due to high risk aversion or market context. We study the relationship between disaster risk reduction and insurance coverage to assess the presence of moral hazard for two different natural hazards, using four econometric models on survey data from Germany and the United States. The results show that moral hazard is absent. Nevertheless, adverse risk selection may be present. This has significant policy relevance such as opportunities for strengthening the link between insurance and risk reduction measures. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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