Legal impossibility or inadmissibility: Is there a need for distinction?
| Autor: | Sanja Radovanović, Nikolina B. Miščević |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
050502 law
021110 strategic defence & security studies 05 social sciences 0211 other engineering and technologies Subject (philosophy) 02 engineering and technology General Medicine legal impossibility of the subject of the contract Law of obligations disposal contracts subject of the contract Political science inadmissibility of the subject of the contract Impossibility binding contracts Law 0505 law Law and economics |
| Zdroj: | Zbornik Radova: Pravni Fakultet u Novom Sadu, Vol 54, Iss 4, Pp 1305-1320 (2020) |
| ISSN: | 2406-1255 0550-2179 |
| Popis: | It is generally accepted that the origin of a contract, i.e. its validity, is influenced by an impossibility that is objective and current, regardless of whether it is legal or factual. From this distinction of possibilities according to different criteria, it follows that there is no universal determination of the possibilities of the subject. Apart from the fact that the theory relativizes possibility as a general condition of the subject of a valid contract, since it binds different legal consequences, certain provisions of the Law on Obligations also contribute to the fact that legal consequences of impossibility are not clearly defined in terms of contract validity. This is especially the case when it comes to legal impossibility. Systematic works of the law of obligations in the domestic literature speak of legal impossibility, as a special species. However, there is a lack of clear demarcation in determining what is meant by it. Therefore, we will try to re-examine whether and when the distinction between legal impossibility and inadmissibility is of practical importance. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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