Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited

Autor: M. Remzi Sanver, Ali Ihsan Ozkes
Přispěvatelé: Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien [Austria] (WU), Pôle Universitaire Léonard de Vinci (PULV), Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision (LAMSADE), Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2021
Předmět:
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking
Lobbying
Elections
Legislatures
and Voting Behavior
502047 Volkswirtschaftstheorie
neutrality
eciency
0502 economics and business
resoluteness
Economics
050207 economics
Axiom
Law and economics
Social policy
050205 econometrics
anonymity
05 social sciences
Pareto efficiency
16. Peace & justice
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
International political economy
502047 Economic theory
050206 economic theory
Neutrality
101017 Game theory
101017 Spieltheorie
Social choice theory
Mathematical economics
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Public finance
Anonymity
Zdroj: Social Choice and Welfare
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2021, 57 (1), pp.97-113. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5⟩
ISSN: 0176-1714
1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01308-5⟩
Popis: International audience; We revisit the incompatibility of anonymity and neutrality in single-valued social choice. We first analyze the irresoluteness outlook these two axioms together with Pareto efficiency impose on social choice rules and deliver a method to refine irresolute rules without violating anonymity, neutrality, and efficiency. Next, we propose a weakening of neutrality called consequential neutrality that requires resolute social choice rules to assign each alternative to the same number of profiles. We explore social choice problems in which consequential neutrality resolves impossibilities that stem from the fundamental tension between anonymity, neutrality, and resoluteness.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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