Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
| Autor: | Olivier Tercieux, Yeon-Koo Che |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Columbia University [New York], Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PJSE), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris)-Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2019 |
| Předmět: |
Counterfactual thinking
Economics and Econometrics Matching (statistics) Mathematical optimization Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory Computer science Calibration (statistics) Economics jel:D63 Stability (learning theory) jel:D61 Stability theory 0502 economics and business Large matching markets Pareto efficiency Stability Fairness Payoff equivalence Asymptotic efficiency and Asymptotic stability Asymptotic efficiencies (Statistics) 050207 economics Mathematics jel:C70 050208 finance 05 social sciences Pareto efficiency Matching theory [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance Uncorrelated Computer Science::Multiagent Systems Incentive compatibility Mathematical economics Stability |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Political Economy Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, 2019, 127 (5), pp.2301-2342. ⟨10.1086/701791⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0022-3808 1537-534X |
| Popis: | International audience; We study Pareto efficient mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individual preferences are randomly drawn from a class of distributions, allowing for both common and idiosyncratic shocks. We provide a broad set of circumstances under which, as the market grows large, all Pareto efficient mechanisms—including top trading cycles (with an arbitrary ownership structure), serial dictatorship (with an arbitrary serial order), and their randomized variants—produce a distribution of agent utilities that in the limit coincides with the utilitarian upper bound. This implies that Pareto efficient mechanisms are uniformly asymptotically payoff equivalent “up to the renaming of agents.” Hence, when the conditions of our model are met, policy makers need not discriminate among Pareto efficient mechanisms based on the aggregate payoff distribution of participants. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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