Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market

Autor: Sylvaine Poret
Přispěvatelé: Alimentation et sciences sociales (ALISS), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA)
Rok vydání: 2002
Předmět:
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure
Firm Strategy
and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Injury control
Distribution networks
Accident prevention
Illicit drugs
030508 substance abuse
Poison control
ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING
[SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences
03 medical and health sciences
0502 economics and business
Illicit drug
JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure
the Legal System
and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Law enforcement
050207 economics
[QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin]
Public economics
05 social sciences
Advertising
16. Peace & justice
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure
Pricing
and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

Vertical relationship
Business
0305 other medical science
Law
Finance
Zdroj: International Review of Law and Economics
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2002, 22 (4), pp.465-493. ⟨10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00115-1⟩
ISSN: 0144-8188
DOI: 10.1016/s0144-8188(02)00115-1
Popis: International audience; This paper presents a model of a vertically organized distribution network of illicit drugs. The key assumptions are costs imposed by law enforcement on drug sellers and the vertical relationship between trackers and retailers. We study the effects of a tougher drug law enforcement policy on wholesale and retail prices of drugs according to the identity of the pursued member of the distribution network, trafficker or retailer. We show that these effects are different according to the used law enforcement tool (probability of detection or sanction) and according to the seller who undergoes the law enforcement (retailer or trafficker). Moreover, results of tougher law enforcement can be opposite to a usual objective of the drug policy, namely, the decrease of the number of consumers. This model could partially explain the failure of the “war on drugs” in the United States in the 1980s.
Databáze: OpenAIRE