Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market
Autor: | Sylvaine Poret |
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Přispěvatelé: | Alimentation et sciences sociales (ALISS), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA) |
Rok vydání: | 2002 |
Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure Firm Strategy and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets Injury control Distribution networks Accident prevention Illicit drugs 030508 substance abuse Poison control ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences 03 medical and health sciences 0502 economics and business Illicit drug JEL: K - Law and Economics/K.K4 - Legal Procedure the Legal System and Illegal Behavior/K.K4.K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law Law enforcement 050207 economics [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin] Public economics 05 social sciences Advertising 16. Peace & justice JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure Pricing and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection Vertical relationship Business 0305 other medical science Law Finance |
Zdroj: | International Review of Law and Economics International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, 2002, 22 (4), pp.465-493. ⟨10.1016/S0144-8188(02)00115-1⟩ |
ISSN: | 0144-8188 |
DOI: | 10.1016/s0144-8188(02)00115-1 |
Popis: | International audience; This paper presents a model of a vertically organized distribution network of illicit drugs. The key assumptions are costs imposed by law enforcement on drug sellers and the vertical relationship between trackers and retailers. We study the effects of a tougher drug law enforcement policy on wholesale and retail prices of drugs according to the identity of the pursued member of the distribution network, trafficker or retailer. We show that these effects are different according to the used law enforcement tool (probability of detection or sanction) and according to the seller who undergoes the law enforcement (retailer or trafficker). Moreover, results of tougher law enforcement can be opposite to a usual objective of the drug policy, namely, the decrease of the number of consumers. This model could partially explain the failure of the “war on drugs” in the United States in the 1980s. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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