Voting corrupt politicians out of office? Evidence from a survey experiment in Paraguay
| Autor: | Rumilda Cañete-Straub, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Karine Van der Straeten, Stéphane Straub |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1), Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Université Toulouse 1 Capitole (UT1)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), Independent Researcher, Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE), DSR-SCD-UT1C, Service Publications, Toulouse Graduate School défis en économie et sciences sociales quantitatives - - CHESS2017 - ANR-17-EURE-0010 - EURE - VALID |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Corruption Proportional representation media_common.quotation_subject Electoral systems Context (language use) Conventional wisdom [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences Power (social and political) Political science Voting Information 0502 economics and business 050602 political science & public administration 050207 economics [SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance B- ECONOMIE ET FINANCE media_common 05 social sciences 16. Peace & justice [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance 0506 political science Test (assessment) Political economy Obstacle |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩ |
| ISSN: | 0167-2681 1879-1751 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more power - both formally through the use of more "open" electoral systems and informally through easier access to information on politicians' wrongdoings - will necessarily result in them voting corrupt politicians out of office. Focusing on a comparison between closed-list and openlist proportional representation systems, we theoretically show that opening the lists is likely to generate a large shift of vote shares in favor of the incumbent parties, which in many countries happen to be the most corrupt. We design a survey experiment to test these predictions in Paraguay and find strong supporting evidence. We do not find in our context that the lack of information is a major obstacle preventing voters from voting out corrupt politicians; if anything, under the more open system, supporters of the incumbent party tend to cast more votes for politicians with a recent history of corruption. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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