Multi Resource Allocation for Network Slices with Multi-Level fairness
| Autor: | Naresh Modina, Mandar Datar, Rachid El-Azouzi, Francesco de Pellegrini |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | datar, mandar, CERI/LIA - University of Avignon, Network Engineering and Operations (NEO ), Inria Sophia Antipolis - Méditerranée (CRISAM), Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria)-Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique (Inria) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
[INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT]
multi-level fairness Fisher market [INFO.INFO-GT] Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] resource allocation networking slicing resource allocation networking slicing Fisher market multi-level fairness |
| Zdroj: | IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC) IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), May 2022, Seoul (Korea), South Korea |
| Popis: | International audience; Network slicing is becoming the platform of choice for several applications and services. Nowadays most applications are virtualized to gain flexibility and portability. With network slicing, operators can create multiple network slices or tenants, which can be used for certain applications with specific requirements. Behind the network slicing, a slice expresses the need to access a precise service type, under a fully qualified set of computing and network requirements. Resource allocation decision encompasses a combination of different resource types (e.g., radio resource, CPU, memory, bandwidth). In this paper, we explore a differential pricing scheme that maximizes social welfare among slices as well as among end-users. To do so, we propose a pricing mechanism that makes fairness at multiple levels: fairness among slices and fairness among slice locations supported by each slice. Therefore, the proposed scheme is beneficial for both the slices and the end-users independent of their location. Additionally, we study the case where slices can manipulate their preferences to improve their utility. We show that the Fisher market game always has a pure Nash equilibrium and we prove Price of Anarchy is 1 N , where N is the number of slices. Finally, we conduct simulations using Amazon EC2 instances to numerically analyze and compare the performance of the mechanisms and confirm the theoretical properties of the market model. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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