Observability and lying

Autor:	Uri Gneezy, Daniel Parra, Tilman Fries, Agne Kajackaite
Jazyk:	angličtina
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management Economics and Econometrics Lying Cheating Observability Social image Double blind Laboratory experiment Computer science fungi Stochastic game Affect (psychology) Settore SECS-P/06 - Economia Applicata Social psychology Anonymity
Popis:	Experimental participants in a cheating game draw a random number and then report any number they wish, receiving a monetary payoff based only on the report. We study how these reports depend on the level of observability of both the random draw and the report by the experimenter. Our results show that whereas increasing the observability of the random draw decreases cheating, increasing the anonymity of the reports does not affect average reports.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22313921adc625205094f9ddf1c43990 http://hdl.handle.net/2434/934348 Zobrazit plný text záznamu