Shaping a buyer's software selection process through tendering legislation
| Autor: | Marjolein van Offenbeek, Albert Boonstra |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Research programme I&O, Value, Affordability and Sustainability (VALUE) |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS
Computer Networks and Communications POWER Proportionality (law) Legislation Rationality 02 engineering and technology Enterprise system Procurement 020204 information systems tendering legislation 0502 economics and business Health care IMPLEMENTATION 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering TECHNOLOGY Decision-making SPECIFICATION Law and economics business.industry decision‐making process public procurement software selection tendering legislation 05 social sciences Public institution decision‐making process software selection PUBLIC PROCUREMENT ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES INFLUENCE TACTICS Business PACKAGED SOFTWARE 050203 business & management Software Information Systems |
| Zdroj: | Information Systems Journal, 28(5), 905-928 |
| ISSN: | 1350-1917 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/isj.12174 |
| Popis: | Tendering legislation aims to enhance competitiveness by promotingequality, proportionality, transparency, and non‐discrimination. Suchlegislation applies to the procurement of software packages by publicinstitutions in many countries. This study explores how tenderinglegislation shapes a buyer's software selection process through thelens of competing decision‐making rationalities. From the literature,3 rationalities enacted in software selection are deduced that werelate to the software selection literature regarding tendering legislation.Through this lens, we subsequently examine how a large healthcare provider selected a supplier for an electronic health recordsystem after an extensive tendering process. Many health careprofessionals within this organization were in favour of a particularsoftware package. Yet, the organization purchased a different packagefrom a relatively unknown supplier, the implementation of whichfailed. The actors involved experienced shaping on 5 decisionmakingthemes, the implications of which are evaluated against thefunctional, economic, and political rationality norms derived fromthe literature. The findings suggest that compliance with tenderinglegislation over the public procurement of software results inincreased legal complexity, greater linearity and objectivity, moreextensive formalization, and less relational communication. Functionalnorms of rationality are stressed, seemingly to balance theenforced economic norms of rationality and to compensate for thedecreased room for political rationality. Even so, the shaping by thetendering legislation threatens functional rationality. Ultimatelyfunctional and economic norms of rationality win over politicalrationality, yet the latter still dribbles through, albeit in a differentguise than reported for software selection in general. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Plný text