When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

Autor:	Antonio Parbonetti, Xing Huan, Michele Fabrizi
Rok vydání:	2020
Předmět:	Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance Libor 05 social sciences Sample (statistics) Commit Monetary economics HG HF5601 Operational risk Incentive 0502 economics and business Business 050207 economics Control sample Finance
Zdroj:	Financial Review. 56:157-178
ISSN:	1540-6288 0732-8516
DOI:	10.1111/fire.12240
Popis:	We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1fb85a1be56808ffe6c832eef4ef843a https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12240 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Plný text