Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure
| Autor: | Ginger Zhe Jin, Daniel Martin, Michael Luca |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
jel:C9
Communication games Disclosure Unraveling Experiments media_common.quotation_subject jel:D82 Internet privacy jel:D83 jel:K2 0502 economics and business Quality (business) Communication source 050207 economics Private information retrieval Consumer behaviour 050205 econometrics Skepticism media_common jel:C92 business.industry 05 social sciences jel:L51 Test (assessment) Product (business) jel:L15 Convergence (relationship) Psychology business General Economics Econometrics and Finance jel:D8 |
| Zdroj: | American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:141-173 |
| ISSN: | 1945-7685 1945-7669 |
| Popis: | This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that market forces can lead businesses to voluntarily provide information about the quality of their products. This theoretical prediction is based on unraveling arguments, which require that consumers hold correct beliefs about non-disclosed information. Instead, we find that receivers are insufficiently skeptical about non-disclosed information, and as a consequence, senders do not always disclose their private information. However, when subjects are informed about non-disclosed information after each round, behavior slowly converges to full unraveling. This convergence appears to be driven by an asymmetric response in receiver actions after learning that they were profitably deceived. Despite the change in receiver behavior, stated beliefs about sender strategies remain insufficiently skeptical, which suggests that while direct and immediate feedback induces equilibrium behavior, it does not reduce strategic naïveté. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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