Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking – Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment
| Autor: | Tobias Körner |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Legal liability Financial system Accounting jel:K20 jel:G21 Corporate governance outside directors legal liability bank risk 0502 economics and business Economics Financial services Finance 040101 forestry Estimation 050208 finance business.industry 05 social sciences 04 agricultural and veterinary sciences Market liquidity jel:G38 Corporate governance outside directors legal liability bank risk Incentive Current liability Capital (economics) Accountability 0401 agriculture forestry and fisheries business Quasi-experiment |
| Popis: | In this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of German savings banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of this reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that savings banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, they have become less vulnerable to unexpected losses and liquidity shocks. This indicates that the low occurrence of outside director litigation reflects incentive effects of current liability regimes. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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