Insurance Search and Switching Behavior
Autor: | B. van der Klaauw, Jonneke Bolhaar, Maarten Lindeboom |
---|---|
Rok vydání: | 2010 |
Předmět: |
Actuarial science
jel:D82 Self-insurance jel:D83 Adverse selection Consumer search Group contracts Health insurance Managed competition Group insurance Liability insurance General insurance jel:I11 Key person insurance health insurance consumer search behavior Dutch health insurance reform jel:I18 Insurance policy Auto insurance risk selection Casualty insurance Business health care economics and organizations |
Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.1646378 |
Popis: | This discussion paper resulted in a publication in 'De Economist' , 2015, 163, 25-60. This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition. Although all insurers offer the same basic package (determined by the government), there is substantial premium dispersion. We develop a simple consumer search model containing the main features of the Dutch health insurance system. This model provides us with a number of hypotheses, which we test using data from the Dutch Health Care Consumer Panel. The data confirm the standard predictions on consumer choice (i.e. there is adverse selection and a lower premium increases coverage). We also find that consumers with lower search costs are more likely to receive a group contract offer. This generates a situation of price discrimination where individuals without group contracts and higher search costs pay higher premiums and buy lower insurance coverage. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
Externí odkaz: |