Reserve accumulation and exchange rate policy in China: The authoritarian elite's aim of political survival
| Autor: | Giovanni B. Pittaluga, Elena Seghezza, Pierluigi Morelli |
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| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
China
Economics and Econometrics 050208 finance 05 social sciences Current account foreign reserves Collective action Foreign-exchange reserves foreign reserves exchange rate policy autocratic regimes 0506 political science Market economy Exchange rate Currency exchange rate policy 0502 economics and business Political Science and International Relations Financial crisis Elite 050602 political science & public administration Economics Renminbi 050207 economics autocratic regimes |
| Zdroj: | European Journal of Political Economy. 47:163-174 |
| ISSN: | 0176-2680 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2017.03.003 |
| Popis: | Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, China has significantly increased its foreign exchange reserves. We argue that the resulting abnormal levels of currency reserves accumulated by Chinese authorities are not intended to maximize the citizenry’s economic welfare, as in a mercantilist or a precautionary account, but rather to forestall the elite’s own political demise. This goal has been pursued mainly by generating large current account surpluses through manipulation of the renminbi exchange rate. The Chinese elite has sought to promote the acceptance of this policy by influencing the costs of collective action taken by winners and losers. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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