Learning and Sophistication in Coordination Games

Autor: Antoine Terracol, Kyle Hyndman, Jonathan Vaksmann
Přispěvatelé: Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University (SMU), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris School of Economics (PSE), École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC)-École normale supérieure - Paris (ENS Paris), Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris sciences et lettres (PSL)-Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS)-Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement (INRAE)
Rok vydání: 2009
Předmět:
Computer science
media_common.quotation_subject
Economics
Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information
Knowledge
and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness
Experiment
Game theory
Learning
Teaching
Coordination
Experiment
Component (UML)
0502 economics and business
Mathematics education
ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDEDUCATION
Learning
JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory
Individual Behavior
Operations management
Coordination game
050207 economics
Sophistication
Game theory
Coordination failure
050205 econometrics
media_common
Short run
Teaching
05 social sciences
ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING
Adversary
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure
Pricing
and Design/D.D4.D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Incentive
Coordination
Zdroj: Experimental Economics
Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2009, 12 (4), pp.450-472. ⟨10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y⟩
ISSN: 1386-4157
1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y⟩
Popis: International audience; This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions--the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent's actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers' behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.
Databáze: OpenAIRE
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