Theory Before the Test: How to Build High-Verisimilitude Explanatory Theories in Psychological Science
| Autor: | Iris van Rooij, Giosuè Baggio |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Empirical data
Psychological science PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Developmental Psychology Development theory Psychology Social 050105 experimental psychology Article theory development formal modeling 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine Leverage (negotiation) Verisimilitude psychological explanation Humans Psychology 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology|Child Psychology computational-level theory PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Social and Personality Psychology levels of explanation General Psychology PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Evolution theoretical cycle bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology 05 social sciences Cognition Cognitive artificial intelligence Evolutionary psychology Biological Evolution Test (assessment) Epistemology bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology|Cognitive Psychology PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Theory and Philosophy of Science PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology other computational analysis bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences PsyArXiv|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Cognitive Psychology bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology|Personality and Social Contexts bepress|Social and Behavioral Sciences|Psychology|Theory and Philosophy Psychological Theory 030217 neurology & neurosurgery bepress|Life Sciences|Ecology and Evolutionary Biology|Evolution |
| Zdroj: | Perspectives on Psychological Science Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16, 682-697 Perspectives on Psychological Science, 16, 4, pp. 682-697 |
| ISSN: | 1745-6924 |
| Popis: | Drawing on the philosophy of psychological explanation, we suggest that psychological science, by focusing on effects, may lose sight of its primary explananda: psychological capacities. We revisit Marr’s levels-of-analysis framework, which has been remarkably productive and useful for cognitive psychological explanation. We discuss ways in which Marr’s framework may be extended to other areas of psychology, such as social, developmental, and evolutionary psychology, bringing new benefits to these fields. We then show how theoretical analyses can endow a theory with minimal plausibility even before contact with empirical data: We call this the theoretical cycle. Finally, we explain how our proposal may contribute to addressing critical issues in psychological science, including how to leverage effects to understand capacities better. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage). |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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