A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks under Uncertainty
| Autor: | Zhifan Xu, Melike Baykal-Gürsoy |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey [New Brunswick] (RU), Rutgers University System (Rutgers), Rutgers Center for Operations Research (RUTCOR), Rutgers University System (Rutgers)-Rutgers University System (Rutgers) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Computer science
Jamming Cooperative jamming 02 engineering and technology Data_CODINGANDINFORMATIONTHEORY Incomplete channel state information Interference (wave propagation) symbols.namesake [INFO.INFO-NI]Computer Science [cs]/Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI] 0203 mechanical engineering Secrecy 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Non-zero sum game Physical layer security [INFO.INFO-GT]Computer Science [cs]/Computer Science and Game Theory [cs.GT] Wireless network business.industry ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS 020302 automobile design & engineering 020206 networking & telecommunications Eavesdropping Zero-sum game Nash equilibrium symbols [MATH.MATH-OC]Mathematics [math]/Optimization and Control [math.OC] business Computer network Communication channel |
| Zdroj: | 16th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2020) 16th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2020), Oct 2020, Washington D.C., United States Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering ISBN: 9783030630850 SecureComm (1) 16th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks (SecureComm 2020), Oct 2020, Washington D.C., United States. ⟨10.1007/978-3-030-63086-7_14⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while an eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero sum game between the network defenders and an eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to a baseline strategy. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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