The Problem of the First Belief: Group Agents and Responsibility
Autor: | Onni Hirvonen |
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Rok vydání: | 2020 |
Předmět: |
Social Psychology
Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) B1-5802 ontologia (filosofia) ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Language and Linguistics social ontology christian list philip pettit uskomukset collective responsibility 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Sociology Philosophy (General) Christian List ryhmät ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS Philip Pettit group agency Pettit Philip ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION philosophy Group (mathematics) Communication 05 social sciences toimijuus 06 humanities and the arts yhteisöt henkilöt Philosophy moraali vastuu Anthropology 060302 philosophy collective beliefs List Christian etiikka moral personhood Social psychology |
Zdroj: | Journal of Social Ontology, Vol 6, Iss 1, Pp 1-20 (2020) |
ISSN: | 2196-9663 2196-9655 |
Popis: | Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case with Christian List and Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency – face the so-called “problem of the first belief” that threatens to make moral reasoning impossible for group agents. This paper introduces three possible solutions to the problem and discusses the effects that these solutions have in regard to the possibility of attributing moral responsibility to groups. |
Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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