A natural mechanism to choose the deserving winner when the jury is made up of all contestants
| Autor: | Pablo Amorós |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2010 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Mechanism design media_common.quotation_subject jel:C72 jel:D71 jel:D78 CONTEST GeneralLiterature_MISCELLANEOUS Subgame perfect equilibrium InformationSystems_GENERAL Jury Subgame Common knowledge mechanism design contests subgame perfect equilibrium Economics Natural (music) Set (psychology) Mathematical economics Finance media_common |
| Popis: | We analyze the problem of a jury choosing the winner from a set of agents when the identity of the deserving winner is common knowledge amongst the jurors but each juror is biased in favor of one different agent. We propose a simple and natural mechanism that implements the socially optimal rule (the winner is the deserving winner) in subgame perfect equilibria. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|