Merit, approbation and the evolution of social structure
| Autor: | Robin Cowan, Nicolas Jonard |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Macro, International & Labour Economics, Mt Economic Research Inst on Innov/Techn, Externe publicaties SBE, RS: GSBE METEOR T4, RS: GSBE TIID |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2007 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics media_common.quotation_subject Social mobility Unobservable Sociology & anthropology Microeconomics Approbation Social status Intergenerational mobility Soziologie Anthropologie Allgemeine Soziologie Makrosoziologie spezielle Theorien und Schulen Entwicklung und Geschichte der Soziologie Trait Economics Upper class General Sociology Basic Research General Concepts and History of Sociology Sociological Theories Economics of Technology ddc:301 Social organization Social psychology Mechanism (sociology) Social structure media_common |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 64, 295-315. Elsevier Science Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization |
| ISSN: | 1879-1751 0167-2681 |
| Popis: | In this paper we study a society in which individuals gain utility from income and from social approbation. Income is correlated with class. Approbation is given to an unobservable trait, which must be signalled through the agent’s social mobility, i.e. class change. Mobility is driven by a simple mechanism involving inheritance, effort and ability. Thus social structure (class composition) is affected by individuals’ quest for approbation, and we study how that affects the emergence and multiplicity of long run social organizations, including hybrid forms of dynasties and meritocracies. Specifically we observe that even though social mobility is driven purely by a meritocratic mechanism, pure dynasties can emerge. We then introduce a feedback between the size of the upper class and its income value, so that effort levels and social structure are jointly endogenous. We derive results on equilibrium effort levels and stationary (when they exist) social structures. Social organization can converge to a unique steady state, multiple long run equilibria or cycles. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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