Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items

Autor:	Issofa Moyouwou, Joseph Siani, Gildas Sédry Fopa
Rok vydání:	2021
Předmět:	Set (abstract data type) Original Paper Economics and Econometrics Cost allocation Consistency (database systems) Class (set theory) Resource (project management) Computer science Cost sharing Independence (mathematical logic) Mathematical economics Social Sciences (miscellaneous) Axiom
Zdroj:	Social Choice and Welfare
ISSN:	1432-217X 0176-1714
DOI:	10.1007/s00355-021-01368-1
Popis:	For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a given resource with respect to their counting liability indices. The main result we obtain holds in the class of cost allocation rules that are additive in cost and simply combines a new independence property together with the well-known axioms of consistency and independence of supplementary items.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1632b5bdc7228d5b4e4f323a374adc69 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01368-1 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink