Dynamic collective choice with endogenous status quo
| Autor: | Antoine Loeper, Wioletta Dziuda |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Gridlock
Economics and Econometrics Status quo media_common.quotation_subject Positive theory C73 D72 D78 [Dynamic voting endogenous status quo supermajority partisanship polarization policy inertia sunset provision JEL Classification Numbers] Economía Microeconomics Polarization 0502 economics and business Monetary-policy 050602 political science & public administration Economics Endogeneity 050207 economics media_common Status quo bias Public economics Majority 05 social sciences Polarization (politics) Conflict of interest Legislature Democracy 0506 political science Political-economy Committee Negotiation Incentive Sunset provision Government Legislative policy-making Inefficiency |
| Zdroj: | e-Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid instname |
| DOI: | 10.1086/686747 |
| Popis: | This paper analyzes an ongoing bargaining situation in which i) preferences evolve overtime, ii) the interests of individuals are not perfectly aligned, and iii) the previous agreement becomes the next status quo and determines the payoffs until a new agreement is reached. We show that the endogeneity of the status quo exacerbates the players’ conflict of interest and decreases the responsiveness of the bargaining outcome to the environment. Players with arbitrarily similar preferences can behave as if their interests were highly discordant. When players become very patient, the endogeneity of the status quo can bring the negotiations to a complete gridlock. Under mild regularity conditions, fixing the status quo throughout the game via an automatic sunset provision improves welfare. The detrimental effect of the endogeneity of the status quo can also be mitigated by concentrating decision rights, for instance, by lowering the supermajority requirement. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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