Lying, speech acts, and commitment
| Autor: | Neri Marsili |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Marsili N. |
| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Deception
Assertion media_common.quotation_subject Definition of lying Performative utterance 0603 philosophy ethics and religion 050105 experimental psychology Philosophy of language 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences Sociology Insincerity media_common Philosophy of science 05 social sciences Assertoric General Social Sciences 06 humanities and the arts Speech act theory Epistemology Philosophy Commitment 060302 philosophy Normative Lying |
| Zdroj: | Synthese. 199:3245-3269 |
| ISSN: | 1573-0964 0039-7857 |
| Popis: | Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts (like promises, assertions, and oaths) that can be lies and speech acts (like commands, suggestions, or assumptions) that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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