Optimal Federalism
| Autor: | Richard W. Tresch |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2023 |
| Předmět: |
Federalist
Population Distribution (economics) Cooperative federalism Outcome (game theory) Tiebout model Microeconomics Competition (economics) Meaning (philosophy of language) Frontier Economics Market power Set (psychology) education Law and economics education.field_of_study Government Hierarchy Information set Public economics business.industry Public sector Locality Sorting Decision rule Economic interventionism Local government Henry George theorem Fiscal federalism Federalism business Mathematical economics |
| DOI: | 10.1016/b978-0-12-822864-7.00026-9 |
| Popis: | This chapter presents a discussion on the optimal federalism. Federalism refers to a hierarchical structure of government in which each person is, simultaneously, a citizen of more than one government. A federalist structure adds considerable depth and complexity to normative public sector theory because of its layered jurisdictions. In particular, government intervention is still justified by the breakdown of the technical and market assumptions underlying a well-functioning competitive market system to address problems such as externalities, decreasing cost production, private information, and market power. In addition, the goal of government intervention remains the social welfare maximization, which translates into the pursuit of efficiency and equity. A federalist structure of governments significantly complicates both the theory and the application of public sector decision rules. The complications lie at the heart of a federalist system—that is, more than one government has jurisdiction over any one person. Given the layered structure, it is all too easy to envision potential inconsistencies and incompatibilities arising if each government simply tries to follow the single-government decision rules of public sector theory. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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