Analyzing the vulnerability of wireless sensor networks to a malicious matched protocol attack
| Autor: | Colin C. Murphy, Philip J. Harris, George D. O'Mahony |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2018 |
| Předmět: |
0209 industrial biotechnology
Mitigation Computer science Space-based applications Interoperability Space 02 engineering and technology Intrusion detection system Malicious challenge Spectrum use ISM band services 020901 industrial engineering & automation 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Protocol Intrusion detection Wireless networks Protocol (object-oriented programming) Distance measurement ISM band Network model Time spectrum analyzer Distance Wireless network Intrusion Standardized protocols Specific vulnerability Zigbee Detection Matched Device errors Malicious matched protocol attack Safety Attack style preys Computer network IoT Protocol-specific structures Attack exploration Inter-Node XBee COTS devices Malicious attack Telecommunication security Safety critical application Hardware Potential detection technique Matched protocol interference Malicious intrusions Spectrum Safety critical services PHY Realistic network model Shelf devices business.industry ComputerSystemsOrganization_COMPUTER-COMMUNICATIONNETWORKS Co-existence 020206 networking & telecommunications ZigBee cluster head network Attack WSN WSN and ZigBee Wireless sensor networks Internet of Things (IoT) Security challenge Security business Interference Wireless sensor network Commercial off-the-shelf Protocols |
| Zdroj: | ICCST |
| Popis: | Safety critical, Internet of Things (IoT) and space-based applications have recently begun to adopt wireless networks based on commercial off the shelf (COTS) devices and standardized protocols, which inherently establishes the security challenge of malicious intrusions. Malicious intrusions can cause severe consequences if undetected, including, complete denial of services. Particularly, any safety critical application requires all services to operate correctly, as any loss can be detrimental to safety and/or privacy. Therefore, in order for these safety critical services to remain operational and available, any and all intrusions need to be detected and mitigated. Whilst intrusion detection is not a new research area, new vulnerabilities in wireless networks, especially wireless sensor networks (WSNs), can be identified. In this paper, a specific vulnerability of WSNs is explored, termed here the matched protocol attack. This malicious attack uses protocol-specific structures to compromise a network using that protocol. Through attack exploration, this paper provides evidence that traditional spectral techniques are not sufficient to detect an intrusion using this style of attack. Furthermore, a ZigBee cluster head network, which co-exists with ISM band services, consisting of XBee COTS devices is utilized, along with a real time spectrum analyzer, to experimentally evaluate the effect of matched protocol interference on a realistic network model. Results of this evaluation are provided in terms of device errors and spectrum use. This malicious challenge is also examined through Monte-Carlo simulations. A potential detection technique, based on coarse inter-node distance measurements, which can theoretically be used to detect matched protocol interference and localize the origin of the source, is also suggested as a future progression of this work. Insights into how this attack style preys on some of the main security risks of any WSN (interoperability, device limitations and operation in hostile environments) are also provided. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
|