Who knows it is a game? On strategic awareness and cognitive ability

Autor:	Dietmar Fehr, Steffen Huck
Rok vydání:	2015
Předmět:	jel:C9 05 social sciences Economics Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous) Contrast (statistics) Cognition Beauty contest Interval (music) strategic awareness cognitive ability beauty contest jel:D0 0502 economics and business 050207 economics Psychology Social psychology jel:C7 050205 econometrics
Zdroj:	Experimental Economics. 19:713-726
ISSN:	1573-6938 1386-4157
Popis:	We introduce the notion of strategic awareness in experimental games which captures the idea that subjects realize they are playing a game and thus have to form beliefs about others' actions. The concept differs from both, rule understanding and rationality. We then turn to experimental evidence from a beauty contest game where we elicit measures of cognitive ability and beliefs about others' cognitive ability. We show that the effect of cognitive ability is highly non-linear. Subjects' behavior below a certain threshold choose numbers in the whole interval and does not correlate with beliefs about others ability. In contrast, choices of subjects who exceed the threshold avoid choices above 50 and react very sensitively to beliefs about others' cognitive ability.
Databáze:	OpenAIRE
Externí odkaz:	https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::12eed292ab8dd8d820af6e3ecf3d172a https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9461-0 Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink