Dictators Don't Compete: Autocracy, Democracy and Tax Competition
| Autor: | Philipp Genschel, Laura Seelkopf, Hanna Lierse |
|---|---|
| Rok vydání: | 2016 |
| Předmět: |
Economics and Econometrics
Sociology and Political Science Tax competition Direct tax media_common.quotation_subject Political-Institutions Tax reform Autocracy Authoritarianism Tax haven Developing-Countries Globalization Politics Market economy Ad valorem tax 0502 economics and business Tax Competition 050602 political science & public administration Economics Regimes 050207 economics Corporate tax media_common Capital Taxation 05 social sciences Democracy Civil-War 0506 political science Value-added tax Policy Capital (economics) Political Science and International Relations Tax policy-making Corporate taxation Expropriation Indirect tax Foreign Direct-Investment |
| Zdroj: | SSRN Electronic Journal. |
| ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
| DOI: | 10.2139/ssrn.2786139 |
| Popis: | It pays to be a tax haven. Ireland has become rich that way. Why do not all countries cut their capital taxes to get wealthy? One reason is structural. As the standard model of tax competition explains, small countries gain from competitive tax cuts while large countries suffer. Yet not all small (large) countries have low (high) capital taxes. Why? The reason, we argue, is political. While the standard model assumes governments to be democratic, more than a third of countries worldwide are non-democratic. We explain theoretically why autocracies are less likely to adjust to competitive constraints and test our argument empirically against data on the corporate tax policy of 99 countries from 1999 to 2011. German Science Foundation via the Collaborative Research Center [597] |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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