Ex-post governance in joint ventures: Determinants of monitoring by JV boards of directors
| Autor: | Frans van den Bosch, Jeffrey J. Reuer, Henk W. Volberda, Elko Klijn |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Management and Organisation, Amsterdam Business Research Institute, Department of Strategic Management and Entrepreneurship, Erasmus School of Economics |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Value (ethics)
Structure (mathematical logic) 050208 finance Scope (project management) business.industry Strategy and Management Corporate governance 05 social sciences Geography Planning and Development Information needs Accounting SDG 17 - Partnerships for the Goals Alliance theory Order (exchange) 0502 economics and business HD28 Marketing business Proxy (statistics) 050203 business & management Finance |
| Zdroj: | Klijn, E, Reuer, J J, Volberda, H W & Van Den Bosch, F A J 2019, ' Ex-post governance in joint ventures: Determinants of monitoring by JV boards of directors ', Long Range Planning, vol. 52, no. 1, pp. 72-85 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2017.10.006 Long Range Planning, 52(1), 72-85. Elsevier Limited Long Range Planning, 52(1), 72-85. Elsevier Ltd. |
| ISSN: | 0024-6301 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.lrp.2017.10.006 |
| Popis: | Considerable advances have been made in corporate governance research in recent years and opportunities exist to consider these developmentswithin alliances. We extend the “scope of operations” hypothesis to the domain of joint ventures. This proposition suggeststhat the monitoring carried out by boards increases when organizations become more complex. The inherent characteristics of JVsgenerate unique sources of complexity that are currently unexplored in the corporate governance literature. First, we seek to determinetheir influence on monitoring by using primary data on JV board monitoring. Second, we adopt the size of JV boards as a proxy formonitoring in order to examine whether the determinants of board size and monitoring in fact coincide and to reveal if certain effects aremasked by using board size as a simple proxy for monitoring. Doing so enables us to investigate the black-box of what boards actually doas well as extend governance research to other organizational forms. Our findings confirm that the unique characteristics of JVs influencethe information needs by the boards resulting in more monitoring by JV directors. Our findings show there is value in bridging alliancetheory and the literature on corporate governance research. We also advance practitioner's understanding by providing suggestions onhow to structure JV boards in relation to their complexity. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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