The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
| Autor: | Lan Zhang, Huanxing Yang, John H. Kagel, Youxin Hu |
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| Rok vydání: | 2020 |
| Předmět: |
Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
Economics and Econometrics Computer science 05 social sciences ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING Conjunction (grammar) Action (philosophy) Human–computer interaction Complete information 0502 economics and business Key (cryptography) 050206 economic theory Coordination game 050207 economics Private information retrieval |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 176:403-415 |
| ISSN: | 0167-2681 |
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.04.003 |
| Popis: | The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information about players’ intensity of preferences are compared to no communication controls. Pre-play communication significantly increases subjects’ payoffs and the probability of coordination, while reducing miscoordination. This results from communication being largely informative, in conjunction with the key prediction of the theory that when two players send different messages, they coordinate on the preferred action of the agent sending the higher message. As predicted, communication becomes more informative as the cost of miscoordination increases. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
| Externí odkaz: |
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