Threshold of preference for collusion and interconnection fees in different market structures: the Tunisian mobile market case

Autor: Walid Hichri, Sami Debbichi
Přispěvatelé: Université de Tunis - El Manar II, Université de Tunis El Manar (UTM), Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Analyse Economique et Développement Durable (AEDD), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] (UJM)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-École normale supérieure - Lyon (ENS Lyon), Dao, Taï, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne), École normale supérieure de Lyon (ENS de Lyon)-Université Lumière - Lyon 2 (UL2)-Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 (UCBL), Université de Lyon-Université de Lyon-Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne (UJM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), University of Tunis El Manar
Jazyk: angličtina
Rok vydání: 2018
Předmět:
JEL: D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure
Pricing
and Design/D.D4.D40 - General

JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure
Firm Strategy
and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

Interconnexion fees
Interconnexion fees
Collusion
Market Structure
Private sector
Public Sector
Tunisian Mobile Market

Cournot competition
Market Structure
Tunisian Mobile Market
Oligopoly
Microeconomics
Market structure
0502 economics and business
Economics
050207 economics
[SHS.ECO] Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
Duopoly
ComputingMilieux_MISCELLANEOUS
050205 econometrics
Public Sector
Liberalization
Collusion
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation
05 social sciences
Private sector
[SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
JEL: L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L96 - Telecommunications
Incentive
Business
Zdroj: International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise
International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise, Inderscience Publishers, 2018, 6 (1), pp. 66-85
International Journal of Collaborative Enterprise, 2018, 6 (1), pp. 66-85
ISSN: 1740-2093
Popis: We present a Cournot model that compares the critical threshold of collusion in Duopoly and Oligopoly Markets where the actors are private, mixed or public. We assume that the incentive critical threshold for collusion depends on the interconnection fees. The different threshold values calculated in each Market structure are then estimated, using the OLS method, with variables related to the Tunisian market structures and prices. The Econometric estimation of the different threshold values is consistent with our theoretical results. Our findings can be used by the decision makers to control collusion, by acting on the level of interconnection fees for each market structure and by implementing the suitable market liberalization policies in this sector.
Databáze: OpenAIRE