Electromagnetic fault injection: the curse of flip-flops
| Autor: | Ludovic Guillaume-Sage, Philippe Maurine, Sébastien Ordas |
|---|---|
| Přispěvatelé: | Smart Integrated Electronic Systems (SmartIES), Laboratoire d'Informatique de Robotique et de Microélectronique de Montpellier (LIRMM), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)-Université de Montpellier (UM) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2017 |
| Předmět: |
Computer Networks and Communications
Computer science Context (language use) 02 engineering and technology Integrated circuit Hardware_PERFORMANCEANDRELIABILITY Computer security computer.software_genre 01 natural sciences law.invention law 0103 physical sciences 0202 electrical engineering electronic engineering information engineering Electronic engineering [SPI.NANO]Engineering Sciences [physics]/Micro and nanotechnologies/Microelectronics Field-programmable gate array Electromagnetic pulse 010302 applied physics Pulse generator Fault injection FLOPS Fault attacks 020202 computer hardware & architecture Physical attacks Microcontroller EM susceptibility computer Software EM injection Model |
| Zdroj: | Journal of Cryptographic Engineering Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Springer, 2017, 7 (3), pp.183-197. ⟨10.1007/s13389-016-0128-3⟩ |
| ISSN: | 2190-8508 2190-8516 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/s13389-016-0128-3⟩ |
| Popis: | International audience; Electromagnetic (EM) waves have been recently pointed out as a medium for fault injection within integrated circuits (IC). Indeed, it has been experimentally demonstrated that an EM pulse (EMP), produced with a high-voltage pulse generator and an injector similar to that used to perform EM analyses, was susceptible to create faults exploitable from a cryptanalysis viewpoint. An analysis of the induced faults revealed that they originated from timing constraint violations. In this context, this paper demonstrates that EM injection, performed with enhanced injectors, can produce not only timing faults but also bit-set and bit-reset faults on an IC at rest. This first result clearly extends the range of the threats associated with EM fault injection. It then demonstrates, considering two different ICs under operation: an FPGA and a modern microcontroller, that faults produced by EMP injection are not timing faults but correspond to a different model which is presented in this paper. This model allows to explain experimental results introduced in all former communications. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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