A Value for Graph-Restricted Games with Middlemen on Edges
| Autor: | Andrés Jiménez-Losada, Antonio C. Alarcón, José Manuel Gallardo Morilla |
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| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2022 |
| Předmět: |
History
Polymers and Plastics Myerson value 12 Matemáticas General Mathematics Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Graph-restricted game cooperative game Shapley value restricted cooperation graph-restricted game Restricted cooperation Computer Science (miscellaneous) Business and International Management Engineering (miscellaneous) Cooperative game |
| Zdroj: | Mathematics; Volume 10; Issue 11; Pages: 1856 |
| Popis: | In a cooperative game with a communication structure, a graph describes the communication possibilities of the players, which are represented by the nodes. We introduce a variation of this model by assuming that each edge in the communication graph represents an agent. These agents simply act as intermediaries, but since they are essential for the cooperation and, consequently, for revenue generation, they will claim their share of the profit. We study this new model of games with a communication structure and introduce an allocation rule for these games. The motivation for analyzing this type of problem is based on the construction of a risk index for the different elements of an internal network. This research has been supported by the Andalusian Regional Government under grant FQM-237. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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