States of mind: emotions, body feelings, and thoughts share distributed neural networks
| Autor: | Kristen A. Lindquist, Suzanne Oosterwijk, Lisa Feldman Barrett, Rebecca Dautoff, Yoshiya Moriguchi, Eric C. Anderson |
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| Přispěvatelé: | Amsterdam Interdisciplinary Centre for Emotion (AICE, Psychology, FMG), Sociale Psychologie (Psychologie, FMG) |
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2012 |
| Předmět: |
Adult
Male Cognitive Neuroscience media_common.quotation_subject Emotions Strict constructionism Brain mapping Article 050105 experimental psychology Young Adult 03 medical and health sciences 0302 clinical medicine Image Interpretation Computer-Assisted Neural Pathways Similarity (psychology) Humans 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences media_common Brain Mapping Artificial neural network Extramural 05 social sciences Brain Magnetic Resonance Imaging Disgust Network activity Neurology Feeling Female Psychology Social psychology 030217 neurology & neurosurgery |
| Zdroj: | NeuroImage, 62(3), 2110-2128. Academic Press Inc. |
| ISSN: | 1095-9572 1053-8119 |
| Popis: | Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love, memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks. In this paper, we report a novel study testing a constructionist model of the mind in which participants generated three kinds of mental states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts) while we measured activity within large-scale distributed brain networks using fMRI. We examined the similarity and differences in the pattern of network activity across these three classes of mental states. Consistent with a constructionist hypothesis, a combination of large-scale distributed networks contributed to emotions, thoughts, and body feelings, although these mental states differed in the relative contribution of those networks. Implications for a constructionist functional architecture of diverse mental states are discussed. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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