Evolutionary Game Theoretic Insights on the SIRS Model of the COVID-19 Pandemic
| Autor: | D. Madeo, C. Mocenni |
|---|---|
| Jazyk: | angličtina |
| Rok vydání: | 2021 |
| Předmět: |
Epidemic Models
Exploit genetic structures Computer science media_common.quotation_subject Chaotic COVID-19 Temptation Article Chaotic behavior Dilemma Game Theory Replicator Equation Epidemic Models SIRS Bifurcations Chaotic behavior COVID-19 Replicator Equation Bifurcations Game Theory Control and Systems Engineering Order (exchange) Pandemic Replicator equation SIRS Epidemic model Mathematical economics media_common |
| Zdroj: | IFAC-Papers |
| ISSN: | 2405-8963 |
| Popis: | The effectiveness of control measures against the diffusion of the COVID-19 pandemic is grounded on the assumption that people are prepared and disposed to cooperate. From a strategic decision point of view, cooperation is the unreachable strategy of the prisoner’s dilemma game, where the temptation to exploit the others and the fear to be betrayed by them drives the people behavior, which eventually results fully defective. In this work, we integrate the SIRS epidemic model with the replicator equation of evolutionary games in order to study the interplay between the infection spreading and the propensity of people to become cooperative under the pressure of the epidemic. We find that the developed model possesses several steady states, including fully or partially cooperative ones and that the presence of such states allows to take the disease under control. Moreover, assuming a seasonal variation of the infection rate, the system presents rich dynamics, including chaotic behavior and epidemic extinction. |
| Databáze: | OpenAIRE |
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